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Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law
Steven Kautz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Law has a notably respectable place in liberal political theory.
Everyone agrees that the "rule of law" is one of the core principles
of liberal constitutionalism. Here, it is said, we enjoy a "government
of laws, and not of men."1
But why do liberals, as a rule, share this respect, even reverence,
for law? The rule of law need not be so honored; it has not been so
honored in many (less liberal, but nevertheless respectable) times
and places. Political theorists who are not liberals have rarely
bestowed upon the idea of law the privileged place it has always held
for liberal political theorists, from Locke to Dworkin. So why is law
so honored here, both in the ideas of liberal political theorists and in
the practice of contemporary liberal democracies? What is so special
about law for liberals?
It is my task here to discuss the place of political theory or political
philosophy in legal scholarship. It is tempting to begin by
emphasizing the gulf between justice and law: The job of political
philosophers is to worry about justice; the job of lawyers is to worry
about the law. Someone might say, then, to the lawyers and law
professors: Justice is none of your business. (That is, it is none of
your business as lawyers: We are all citizens too.) But this useful
division of labor is perhaps not quite intelligible in the liberal polity,
where it is so hard to think about justice without also thinking about
the law. So we must begin this inquiry, it seems to me, with this
superficial appearance: Law has an unusually proud place in the
liberal understanding. Liberal political theory somehow teaches us
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory University. I am grateful to the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation for its generous support of this work.
1. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 23 (1958); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988).
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that law and justice are inextricably bound, and so it might seem to
authorize lawyers to become political philosophers. What's wrong
with that?
The philosophical question-"What is the nature of law in liberal
society?" - is theoretically prior to the question of scholarship that is
our theme here. Our question-"What ought to be the place of
humane or liberal studies, including political philosophy, in legal
scholarship?"-cannot be answered well without thinking first about
a series of more fundamental questions of political philosophy: What
is law? What is the meaning of the idea of "the rule of law," lately so
much in traffic? What is the place of law in liberal society in
particular, where the first aim of political life is to secure the
blessings of liberty?
Suppose, for example, that one judges liberal political theory to be
an apology for privilege, prejudice, or illegitimate power. And
suppose that one believes that liberal political institutions are masks,
having the effect and perhaps the purpose of sustaining wicked
privilege, and crushing the worthy aspirations of the marginalized,
the disadvantaged, the weak. Then the idea of the rule of law would
itself be suspect: It would seem to be a tool of oppression, its
pretended neutrality an insult that, once noticed, would make the
injury the more intolerable The business of the law professor would
then be indistinguishable from the business of the humane student of
politics generally: The most urgent task would be to transform or
perhaps to destroy liberal institutions (not least to undermine liberal
apologetics about the rule of law); legal scholarship (like political
theory and literary criticism) would have to become politicized,
engaged, a weapon in the war against liberal injustice. And the rules
of academic etiquette-the good manners of professors that mark
disciplinary boundaries and spheres of professional competence, that
establish standards of what counts as doing political philosophy or
legal reasoning, and that provide for the informal enforcement of
these norms-would themselves seem to be instruments of a liberal
tyranny? Such boundaries must be, as is sometimes said,
"transgressed." If the law professor behaves herself and respects
these boundaries and norms, does she not thereby confess that the
liberal order within which such rules make sense-someone has to
execute stock trades, someone has to make sense of the rules of
evidence-is more or less reasonable, more or less just? By obeying
2. As Roberto Unger says, "a doctrinal practice that puts its hope in the contrast of legal
reasoning to ideology, philosophy, and political prophecy ends up as a collection of makeshift
apologies." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 11
(1983).
3. See id. at 118-19.
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the rules,, she postpones the revolution.
Suppose, on the other hand, that one takes liberal political
theory-as articulated, for example, in Rawls's A Theory of
Justice4-to be the last word in political philosophy. Suppose, in
other words, that one judges that we liberals have lately discovered
the whole truth about justice. Only the footnotes remain. What
then? In that case, too, one's philosophical views will likely
determine one's views on the question regarding scholarship that is
before us. If the principal business of liberal political philosophy is to
teach citizens what their rights are, and if we now have a rigorous
and certain knowledge of these rights, formerly unavailable, then
surely it is the business of the law professor (in happy alliance with
political philosophers and judges) to find a way to secure these rights
in law. What good is the truth-what good is wisdom-if we cannot
find a way to establish that truth as politically authoritative, to
enable wisdom, if not the wise, to rule? And for that purpose,
certainly, law professors are essential. They are the necessary link
between philosophers and judges-between the impotent reasonings,
the talk without arms, of political philosophers, and the potent
reasonings of judges, who have a grasp on the collective force of the
community but are unfortunately sometimes ill-informed about the
latest developments in liberal political philosophy. So the law
professor ought to concern himself with the business of achieving a
"fusion of constitutional law and moral theory," on the basis of the
"better philosophy [that] is now available,"5 and spreading the good
word to judges.
Now these are caricatures, of course. But the two opposing
tendencies I describe are real forces in the contemporary academy,
including the legal academy. These philosophical postures toward
liberalism have, in fact, inspired modes of legal reasoning to suit
them: Both postures authorize or even require lawyers to become
political philosophers. That is why the question of legal scholarship is
first of all a philosophical question. But both philosophical postures,
and the modes of legal reasoning they inspire, seem to me
dangerous. It is my task in this essay to say why, and to sketch a
sounder way of thinking about liberal politics, one that also has this
consequence: Law professors should learn again to mind their own
business, to attend to the law and forget about justice.
In Part II, I present an interpretation of liberalism, closer in spirit
to the liberalism of Locke and Montesquieu than to the liberalism of
Rawls and Dworkin, that helps to explain the curious dignity of the
4. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
5. RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1st. ed. 1977).
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idea of the rule of law in liberal political theory. I argue that classical
liberalism aims above all to remedy our natural human condition of
insecurity, and that it succeeds in part by subordinating the quest for
justice to the rule of law. Thus, for example, the classical liberal
argues that procedural principles of equality (above all, the Lockean
principle of consent) trump substantive principles of equality (such
as Dworkin's "principle of equal concern and respect"6).
In Part III, I argue that liberal justice is not merely procedural:
Liberal justice is not obedience to law simply, it is reasonable
obedience to laws that respect the natural equality of human beings.
But I argue that these higher reaches of liberal justice belong to the
spheres of liberal statesmanship and liberal political philosophy, not
liberal law. And I argue that it is not the task of lawyers as lawyers to
educate the public mind regarding these higher demands of justice.
This is properly a task for citizens and statesmen, some of whom may
happen to be political philosophers or lawyers.
In Part IV, I return to the question of scholarship regarding the
relation between political philosophy and legal reasoning with which
I began. I argue that the line between these modes of thinking in
contemporary legal scholarship is often blurry and indistinct. After
examining Dworkin's argument that legal reasoning is inescapably
philosophical, I argue that this now common sense of the matter is
mistaken. I conclude that the liberal polity is best served by
preserving a rather strict division of labor between philosophers and
lawyers.
II. LIBERTY, SECURITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW
Let me begin by presenting an account of liberalism that will help,
I think, to explain the otherwise curious dignity of the idea of law in
liberal political theory. Classical liberalism is the view that liberty is
the fundamental political good because it is the most certain means
to peace among natural foes who must learn to live together as civil
friends.7 I acknowledge that this account of liberalism is somewhat
old-fashioned, more Lockean than Rawlsian, and that to some it will
seem to be a caricature. To such doubts, I say, perhaps there is more
to liberalism, but this hard truth is the (often forgotten) foundation
of liberalism!
6. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).
7. The authoritative statement of this view is JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 267-85, 323-53 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). On
Locke's liberalism, see THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988);
and NATHAN TARCOV, LOCKE'S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY (1984).
8. Of course, I do not here present a full account of the differences between the classical
liberalism of Locke and Montesquieu and the new liberalism of Rawls and Dworkin. Here, I
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Liberalism strictly speaking is the doctrine that liberty is the
fundamental political good. Where there is no liberty, all other
political goods-justice, virtue, prosperity, equality-are quite
beyond our reach. And what is liberty? Here is the original
understanding of liberty: "[P]olitical liberty," says Montesquieu, "is
that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each citizen
has of his security and in order for him to have this liberty the
government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another
citizen."9 That is liberty: One citizen must not fear another citizen.
And this is so whether that other citizen is a ruler or a common
thief. "The Injury and the Crime is equal," says Locke, "whether
committed by the wearer of a Crown, or some petty Villain."'"
"Should a Robber break into my House, and with a Dagger at my
Throat, make me seal Deeds to convey my Estate unto him, would
this give him any Title?"' Surely not. But,
the Title of the Offender, and the Number of his Followers
make no difference in the Offence, unless it be to aggravate it.
The only difference is, Great Robbers punish little ones, to keep
them in their Obedience, but the great ones are rewarded with
Laurels and Triumphs, because they are too big for the weak
hands of Justice in this World, and have the power in their own
possession, which should punish Offenders. 2
And so the first task of the liberal polity is to secure citizens against
robbers, both petty and great-that is, against the mugger on the
focus on one particular ground of dispute between the old liberals and the new: the question of
the relation between the rule of law and philosophy. This difference, I argue, has its roots in a
difference regarding the end of liberalism: Is the end of liberalism "security" (as Locke and
Montesquieu argue) or "equal concern and respect" (in Dworkin's formulation)? Various
contemporary statements of the case for the sort of liberalism described in the text can be
found in STEVEN KAUTZ, LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITY (1995); PATRICK NEAL,
LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1997) (arguing for "vulgar" or "Hobbesian" liberalism
against both "comprehensive" liberalism and "political" liberalism); and Judith N. Shklar, The
Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989)
(arguing that liberalism is founded above all on a fear of political cruelty). See also HARVEY C.
MANSFIELD, JR., THE SPIRIT OF LIBERALISM (1978). Liberal legal theorists today almost
invariably defend a species of Rawlsian liberalism, but this is no longer true among liberal
political theorists more generally. One aim of this paper is to argue that a recovery of the
classical understanding of liberalism would require liberal legal theorists to adopt a less
philosophical mode of legal reasoning. I argue that the classical understanding of liberalism
makes greater sense of the respect for the rule of law that characterizes liberal political
philosophy than does Rawlsian liberalism, and further that it teaches liberal political
philosophers and legal theorists that in important respects law trumps "justice."
9. CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). The account of
liberalism in the text begins from Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison, because these political
philosophers are the founders of the liberalism of security or tranquility that is presented here
as an alternative to the more conventional liberalism of equal concern and respect.
10. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 385.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 385-86.
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dark city street corner and against the tyrant, who sometimes comes
in numbers (the "tyranny of the majority") and who would strike at
our lives and liberties under color of law. Thus both the law-and-
order conservative and the civil libertarian have essential and
respectable places in the liberal polity, each with a task that will be
from time to time more urgent than the other's. First, defeat the
(lawless) petty criminal; then restrain the (lawless) tyrannical
magistrate. One citizen must not fear another citizen: That is liberty.
The whole architecture of the liberal state is built on this low but
solid foundation. All of the familiar institutions and principles of the
liberal state were designed, one way or another, to secure us against
robbers, petty and great.
Here I will describe five of the most fundamental liberal principles
and institutions, each of which arose principally from a concern for
security or tranquility. First, for the sake of liberty understood as
security, and recognizing with the authors of The Federalist that in a
republican political community the principal threat to security would
come from majority factions undertaking schemes of oppression,
liberals established a limited government founded on the so-called
new "science of politics."13 This new science was discovered by
"enlightened friends to liberty"'4 as a remedy for the ills of popular
governments, which "have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property."" Thus, the familiar
institutions established in the Constitution and defended in The
Federalist: separation of powers and checks and balances;
representation and "the total exclusion of the people in their collective
capacity" from any share in government; an independent judiciary;
the large commercial republic; and federalism.16
Second, for the sake, once again, of liberty understood as security,
and recognizing with Montesquieu that our "security is never more
attacked than by public or private accusations," 7 liberals established
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 119 (Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
14. Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 126 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 373 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). For a debate
between an old liberal and a new one on questions of liberal constitutionalism, see Robert H.
Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 230 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1986); and James
W. Ceaser, In Defense of Republican Constitutionalism: A Reply to Dahl, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra, at 253. Compare ROBERT DAHL,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 312 (1989) (arguing for changes in constitutional structure to
"help make political life more democratic" than it now is in liberal constitutional states), with
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL at ix (1991) (defending a
liberal or "constitutional view of American politics" against the "increasing democratism of
our politics").
17. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 188. For a new liberal account of the differences
between old and new liberals on these questions of criminal law, see DWORKIN, supra note 6,
440
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an independent judiciary and authorized that judiciary to secure the
rights of the accused against tyrannical magistrates. And liberals
even embraced a conception of the criminal law that on the whole
reflects Montesquieu's judgment that the only true crimes are crimes
against private security and crimes against public tranquility: There
are no crimes, strictly speaking, against religion or against mores,
because to punish such crimes "destroys the liberty of citizens by
arming against them the zeal" of the righteous and the pure."8
Third, for the sake of liberty understood as security, and
recognizing that, as Madison says in his Memorial and Remonstrance,
"torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts
of the secular arm to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all
difference in Religious opinions," liberals established religious
freedom, in an effort to destroy the "malignant influence [of
religious discord] on the health and prosperity of the State."'9 Like
Locke and Hobbes, Madison knew that few ills compare to the
"miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre."'2
Fourth, for the sake of liberty understood as security, and
recognizing with Locke that our natural condition is one of miserable
poverty-hence insecurity-liberals established a large and robust
commercial republic, founded on respect for rights of property and
contract, in order to unleash human industry. Moreover, as the
authors of The Federalist argue, the "most common and durable
source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of
property."'" As is well known, the large commercial republic is at the
at 197-98, 200-01.
18. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 190.
19. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 11
(Marvin Meyers ed., Univ. Press New England 1981) (1785). For a classical liberal discussion of
religious liberty, see WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); and WALTER BERNS, The Importance of Being Amish, in IN
DEFENSE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 299 (1984). For other liberal perspectives, see William
Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468
(1995); and Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Finally, see Richard Rorty, The Priority
of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257
(Merrill Peterson & Robert Vaughan eds., 1988) for a radically new liberal perspective on
questions of religious liberty.
20. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 128 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 124 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also
LOCKE, supra note 7, at 285-302. For old and new liberal perspectives on rights of property, see
DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 187, 192-96, 199; UNGER, supra note 2, at 57-88; Frank I.
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls's Theory of Justice,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Marc F. Plattner, American Democracy and the Acquisitive
Spirit, in How CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 1 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A.
Schambra eds., 1982); and Marc F. Plattner, The Welfare State v. the Redistributive State, 55
PUBLIC INTEREST 28 (1979).
1999]
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heart of the liberal strategy for taming the natural and enduring
struggles between the rich and the poor. Beyond this, as
Montesquieu argues, commerce "cures destructive prejudices" and
"softens mores"22 -and generally makes human beings gentler and
more reasonable. For all of these reasons, promoting commerce and
protecting rights of property are essential features of the liberal
project of securing liberty.'
And fifth, for the sake of liberty understood as security, and
recognizing with Montesquieu that no accusations are more
threatening to the security of the individual than those that aim to
punish thoughts or ideas-since, to say no more, such accusations
admit of only the most imperfect sorts of proof and thus invite
abuse-liberals have established freedom of speech and freedom of
thought, including above all the rule that "speech becomes criminal
only when it prepares, when it accompanies, or when it follows a
criminal act."24
So what is the place of the "rule of law" in this liberal story? The
principal root of the insecurity of human beings, which liberalism
seeks to ameliorate, is the lawlessness of the most natural human
passions-or, more precisely, the inefficacy of the law of nature in the
state of nature, in the absence of a common power to secure
obedience to law. The great task of liberal political theory and liberal
statesmanship is to secure obedience to law, or to teach the
reasonableness of obedience to law. Here is Hobbes's argument (but
on this point, Locke certainly follows Hobbes): "[T]he passions that
encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as
are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to
obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace,
upon which men may be called to agreement."2 But it turns out,
Hobbes continues, that the natural passions that incline human
beings toward peace are weak and ineffective, for reasons that are
familiar: Where there is "no visible Power to keep them in awe, and
tye them by feare of punishment to the... observation of [the]
Lawes of Nature," human beings will be tempted to pursue other
goods, beyond security; "the miserable condition of Warre... is
22. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 338.
23. See id. at 338-53.
24. Id. at 199. For a classical liberal account of freedom of speech, see WALTER BERNS,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976). For another
liberal view, see CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
For a new liberal account, see DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 335-72; CATHERINE MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS (1993); see also RONALD DWORKIN, MacKinnon's Words, in FREEDOM'S LAW
227 (1996) (discussing MacKinnon's Only Words).
25. HOBBES, supra note 20, at 90.
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necessarily consequent.., to the naturall Passions of men."26 Indeed,
"the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and
(in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to) of themselves,
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed,
are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality,
Pride, Revenge, and the like."'27
Perhaps the rule of law has pride of place in the liberal
understanding because the fundamental problem of political life is to
remedy the insecurity that follows inescapably from the natural
lawlessness of human beings. If the end of political life is liberty
understood as security, and if security is threatened above all by the
natural lawlessness of human beings, then establishment of the rule
of law will be the principal means to achieve the end of liberty.
Consider Montesquieu's radical but precise formulation of the point:
"Liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit; and if one
citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer have liberty
because others would likewise have this same power."' On this
account, liberty is mutual obedience to law-no more, no less.
Let's follow this classical liberal argument a little further. Locke
agrees with Hobbes: The natural passions of human beings will drive
us, in various ways, toward disobeying the Law of Nature, which
would teach us "Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and
Preservation," if we could attend to it.29 But we cannot. And this is
so, perversely, in spite of our natural desire for self-preservation and
security, toward which obedience to the Law of Nature would surely
tend. Consider, for example, the crucial problem of the executive
power in the state of nature. Locke argues that, where there is no
common power, every human being retains an equal right to punish
violators of the Law of Nature.' This follows immediately from the
natural equality of human beings: If anyone were to claim an
exclusive executive power in the state of nature, he would thereby
claim a natural right to rule; but no one is entitled to rule by nature,
since we are by nature equals. Yet this arrangement of the executive
power, the power to punish those who violate the Law of Nature,
ensures the inefficacy of the Law of Nature, Locke argues. Human
beings who feel aggrieved will ordinarily "use a Criminal when he
has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats,
or boundless extravagancy of his own Will," and not "as calm reason
26. Id. at 117.
27. Id. (emphasis in original). For Locke's perspective on the same issue, see LOCKE, supra
note 7, at 269-82, 323-24.
28. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 155.
29. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 280.
30. See id. at 272, 275.
1999]
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and conscience dictates. ' 3' That is, human beings will often neglect
their best self-interest, misled by a blind self-love. Escalation is
inevitable: My enemies will respond to the "passionate heats" and
"boundless extravagancy" of my friends, who will respond in kind,
and so on and on and on.32 Thus, "the State of War once begun,
continues," with no end in prospect.3 Innocent bystanders who are
neither friends nor enemies will prudently shy away from such
quarrels: The inefficacy of any imaginable arrangement for neutral
arbitration of disputes is perhaps the fundamental defect of the state
of nature. Locke concludes: "Civil Government is the proper
Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must
certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in their own Case."'
Civil government is first and fundamentally the rule of law: where
men may not be judges in their own case; where there is government
of laws, not of men. Law has an unusually distinguished place in the
liberal understanding of politics above all because the natural
lawlessness of the human passions is the principal threat to a civilized
politics. The rule of law is the necessary remedy for this natural
disorder.
More generally, to return to the problem of the inefficacy of the
Law of Nature in the state of nature, the Law of Nature can be
known only to its "Studiers,"35 says Locke. Yet who has time to study
in our ordinary state of penury and insecurity? More precisely,
reason must be made to come to the aid of the liberal passions, for
Locke as for Hobbes; but, for Locke as for Hobbes, human reason is
too easily vanquished by ordinary passions and prejudices. Thus,
when Locke surveys the nations of the world, he sees an
extraordinary diversity of human institutions, but rather few pleasing
spectacles and many follies and brutalities. He has "but little
Reverence for the Practices which are in use and in credit amongst
Men," he says, for these most often have their roots in the conceits of
the passions and the imagination, bolstered over time by custom and
authority-not in the calm reason that teaches a reasonable love of
liberty.' This Lockean pessimism regarding the power of reason
appears in a splendid passage from the First Treatise:
Thus far can the busie mind of Man carry him to a Brutality
below the level of Beasts, when he quits his reason, which places
31. Id. at 272.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 281 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 275.
36. Id. at 183.
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him almost equal to angels. Nor can it be otherwise in a
Creature, whose thoughts are more than the Sands, and wider
than the Ocean, where fancy and passion must needs run him
into strange courses, if reason, which is his only Star and
compass, be not that he steers by. The imagination is always
restless and suggests variety of thoughts, and the will, reason
being laid aside, is ready for every extravagant project; and in
this State, he that goes farthest out of the way, is thought fittest
to lead, and is sure of most followers: And when Fashion hath
once Established, what Folly or craft began, Custom makes it
Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to
contradict or question it. He that will impartially survey the
Nations of the World, will find so much of their Governments,
Religions, and Manners brought in and continued amongst them
by these means, that he will have but little Reverence for the
Practices which are in use and credit amongst Men."
There is little place for the reasonable love of liberty in this mad
world, ruled as it is by imagination, fancy, passion, folly, craft,
custom, religion, and not by reason: Indeed, perhaps the love of
liberty will itself "be thought impudence or madness."
A politics of liberty can be achieved only at the end of this sorry
history, when the (true) madness is evident to all. Only then can
peaceful reason supply the defect of the peaceful passions by
teaching human beings who have grown tired of endless war the
necessity of the rule of law, limited government, self-restraint of
political parties and religious sects, mutual respect for rights, and so
on.
It would certainly be unreasonable, on this liberal view, to permit
"reason" to rule directly-or, put otherwise, to submit to the rule of
putatively wise rulers. Locke makes this clear in his account of the
natural history of political communities (in Chapter VIII of the
Second Treatise).' At first, says Locke, rulers were "Fathers" and
then "Generals," apparently trustworthy elders who seemed wise
and strong to our more innocent forebears. The view that
government is by nature monarchical and that the wise and strong
are entitled to rule is, so to speak, a natural confusion. But soon
enough, these trusted rulers began to behave treacherously,
motivated by "vain ambition," the wicked love of gain, and "evil
Concupiscence," among other vices.39 After this historical progress,
"Men found it necessary to examine more carefully the Original and
37. Id. at 182-83.
38. Id. at 334-44.
39. Id. at 342.
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Rights of Government; and to find out ways to restrain the
Exorbitances, and prevent the Abuses of that Power which they
having intrusted in another's hands only for their own good, they
found was made use of to hurt them."'  History teaches that
government of men, however (seemingly) wise and trustworthy,
must be replaced by government of laws.
This line of reasoning sheds further light on the honored place of
the idea of law in liberal political theory. There is, after all, a
respectable alternative to the rule of law. Aristotle asks in The
Politics, for example, "whether it is more advantageous to be ruled
by the best man or by the best laws."'" He concludes-surprisingly,
on the liberal view-that there is no certain answer to this question.
On the one hand, "law is intellect without appetite."42 Since the
passions often "pervert rulers and [even] the best men,"43 the rule of
law must be superior even to the rule of good and prudent
statesmen. On the other hand, laws are too rigid and "do not
command with a view to circumstances."" Sometimes the law judges
poorly, because the law is blind to particulars; for this reason, "the
best regime is not one based on written... laws," but one that
authorizes wise and virtuous rulers to judge with a view to
circumstances.45 That Aristotle would reach a conclusion that differs
from Locke's is of course unsurprising. The case for the rule of law is
surely strongest where the end of political life is liberty, or liberty
understood as security. But suppose (against the liberal) that the
salvation of souls, or the propagation of the truth, or the inculcation
of virtue is the true end of political life. In that case, it is not at all
clear that the rule of law would be superior to the rule of certain
human beings-say, the pious, or the wise, or the virtuous.
But Locke argues that rule by consent is safer than the rule of the
putatively wise. Wisdom is rare, and who can tell the difference
between wisdom and a clever fraud? Better to trust ourselves: We
may not know our own best interests as well as some philosopher (or
judge), but we can be sure that we have our own best interests at
heart. Here is the danger: The natural condition of human beings, in
the absence of a common judge who can enforce common judgments
about political right, is an incipient war of all against all. But this is
surely an unstable situation, one that almost inevitably leads to the
40. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
41. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 111 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1984).
42. Id. at 114.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at ill,114.
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establishment of tumultuous and illiberal political communities
where petty warfare is replaced by partisan and sectarian warfare-
often between rich and poor, sometimes among religious sects or
other parties animated by one or another of the bizarre opinions
contrived by the imaginations of human beings. There is a kind of
communitarian logic about war: Human beings at war seek allies
because they have enemies. Alliances, parties, sects will soon
conceive the ideologies or dogmas that are necessary to justify
oppressing their enemies, thus arming the warlike passions by
civilizing them. (This is the natural origin of "community.") Here,
then, is a task for the so-called wise: to teach the myths and
ideologies that constitute illiberal communities. "And when Fashion
hath once Established, what Folly or craft began, Custom makes it
Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to contradict or
question it."' So-called wisdom is often or always the craft of
demagogues, ideologues, or sectarians.
What is called wisdom is mere "private judgment," says Locke,47
following Hobbes,"5 and private judgment is simply not to be trusted.
Hence, the liberal social contract: "[AIll private judgment of every
particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be
Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all
Parties,... concerning any matter of right." " Liberal government is
government established by the consent of free and equal persons,
with no privileges granted to any species of private judgment. As
Walter Berns argues,
each man agrees that his opinions of good and bad, right and
wrong, justice and injustice are just that-private opinions-and
the principle of equality requires him to acknowledge that other
opinions, even if they are contrary to his own, have as much (or
as little) dignity as his own .... Leave other men alone in
exchange for the promise, which the sovereign will enforce, to
leave you alone. The happy consequence of this sovereign's
peace is liberty, which is why some have given the name
liberalism to this kind of politics."0
Thus, "in a world where all opinions of justice and injustice are
understood to be merely private opinions, no man can rationally
46. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 183; see also KAuTz, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing these
problems).
47. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 324.
48. See THOMAS HOBBES, The Citizen, in MAN AND CITIZEN 87, 97 (Bernard Gert ed.,
1991) ("the sayings and judgements of private men").
49. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 324.
50. WALTER BERNS, Judicial Review of the Rights and Laws of Nature, in IN DEFENSE OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 19, at 29, 40.
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agree to an arrangement where another man is authorized to convert
his opinion into fundamental law."'"
The rule of law has an unusually distinguished place in the classical
liberal understanding of politics, above all because the natural
lawlessness of the human passions is the principal threat to a civilized
politics. But there is a second reason for the unusual respect for the
rule of law of liberal theorists: an abiding suspicion of all "private
judgment," even the private judgment of the putatively wise. For this
reason, too, government of laws is superior to government of men:
Rule by consent ensures greater security than the rule of the wise
exercising private judgment beyond consent.
Now, where is "justice" in this liberal teaching? Is justice simply
obedience to law, and no more? Must the liberal say: Who cares
what the laws forbid and what they permit, so long as they are
obeyed? Indeed, Locke does sometimes go so far as to conclude that
an established civil law that enjoys the consent of the people is
superior to the Law of Nature itself:
For though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational Creatures; yet Men being biassed by their Interest, as
well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it
as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular Cases. 2
Forget about justice ("the Law of Nature"), Locke almost says: That
is an imagination. Attend instead to the business of establishing and
preserving the rule of law.
Put another way, the dignity of law in liberal political theory is
achieved, it now appears, by means of diminishing the claims of
justice-and therefore, incidentally, of political philosophy. On the
view advanced so far, the business of the lawyer is simply to sustain
respect for law, and no more. Indeed, for the lawyer to worry too
much about justice might appear to be a dangerous attempt to
smuggle into the liberal polity a species of private judgment. This is
the fundamental ground of the frequent complaint about "activist"
judges-that they are practicing a sort of judicial tyranny,
substituting the private judgment of the philosopher-judge for the
consent of the people.
51. Id. at 54.
52. LOCKE, supra note 7, at 351. The quoted passage occurs in the context of Locke's
specifications of the conditions for the rule of law: an established, settled, known law; a known
and indifferent judge; and a means of ensuring that the collective force of the community will
be employed to enforce the laws and the judgments of the courts. See also id. at 324 (arguing
that "all private judgment of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes
to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties").
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Respect for the rule of law is the heart of liberal justice. To say this
is, perhaps, to embrace the disreputable sophistic argument that
there is no justice beyond the law because justice is the advantage of
the established ruling body. The liberal might respond that here the
established ruling body, or sovereign, is the whole people. However
that may be, the classical liberal principle is also at least akin to the
harsh, but more respectable, Hobbesian doctrine that, there being no
calamity so terrible as civil war, any political order is superior to
disorder. The argument so far suggests that liberty (or security)
arises at least as much from the mere fact of the rule of law as from
the content of the laws: Who cares what the laws permit and what
they forbid, so long as they are obeyed?
But this conclusion is not quite right. As Locke says in opposition
to Hobbes:
Absolute Monarchs are but Men, and if Government is to be the
Remedy of those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens
being Judges in their own Cases, and the State of Nature is
therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of
Government that is, and how much better it is than the State of
Nature, where one Man commanding a multitude, has the
Liberty to be Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his
Subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any
one to question or controle those who Execute his Pleasure?53
The rule of law, with no man a judge in his own case, is itself a
bedrock principle of justice for the liberal Locke (as it is not for the
illiberal Hobbes): No citizen can be above the law. Yet, the end of
government here is still security. Putting the point most generally, a
so-called law (or constitutional design) that failed to uphold or
respect the rule of law as a constitutional principle would be unjust.
For Locke, one might say, justice is obedience to law, so long as the
rule of law generally is faithfully respected-that is, so long as there
is government of laws, not of men.
And yet, this is evidently a very low standard of justice, in light of
which almost all laws in a liberal constitutional republic would surely
pass muster. Liberal justice demands that the constitution of the
liberal polity establish the rule of law. But liberal justice tells us little
or nothing, on this view, about what those laws should permit or
forbid. Again, consider Montesquieu's radical but precise
formulation of the point: "Liberty is the right to do everything the
laws permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he would
53. Id. at 276.
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no longer have liberty because others would likewise have this same
power."' Liberty is mutual obedience to law; justice is the
(constitutional) establishment of the rule of law.
To be sure, the idea of the rule of law can serve as a rather robust
principle of constitutional right, or justice. But the present point is
that this principle is (on the whole) procedural rather than
substantive. That is, liberal justice demands that no citizen be above
the law; that the law be well settled and duly promulgated; that the
forms of popular consent be respected; that the judges be known and
impartial; that the judgments of courts be fully and equitably
enforced; and so on. But it is hard to discover in the idea of the rule
of law itself any substantive principles of liberal justice, except-
perhaps, and only at some fairly high level of generality-a
commitment to equality, especially equality of natural rights. This
argument is one theoretical ground for the doubts of some lawyers
regarding the idea of "substantive" due process: The attempt to
smuggle substantive principles of justice into the idea of due process,
or the rule of law, goes well beyond the terms of the liberal social
contract, which is the origin of this constitutional guarantee.
This feature of the classical liberal argument is accentuated by the
liberal suspicion of so-called "private judgment." That is, if the forms
of popular consent are unlikely to yield agreement on robust
substantive principles of justice (as not only Locke, but also Rawls
and other contemporary "political liberals" would seem to admit, on
the ground that liberal polities are ordinarily marked by deep
disagreements regarding justice),55 then such principles will most
commonly issue from the suspect "private judgments" of some party
or sect. This emergence of private judgment is one origin of populist
complaints about political elitisms on both the left and the right-for
example, the elitism of the foreign policy establishment on free trade
issues, or the elitism of the legal establishment on privacy issues.
Such substantive principles of justice will, in other words, often
reflect an illicit attempt by some party or sect to claim a right to rule
beyond consent, on the basis (more or less) of superior wisdom or
knowledge. So, for this reason too, substantive principles of justice
are suspect, on the classical liberal view.
A friend of liberalism might object at this point that even classical
liberalism contains a substantive teaching about political right, or
justice. Thus:
54. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at 155.
55. See JOHN RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM at xvi (1993) (arguing for a political
liberalism that recognizes that "a modem democratic society is characterized not simply by a
pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines").
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.-That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 6
What has been missing from this account of liberal justice, it might
be said, is sufficient regard for the rationalism ("self-evident truths")
and the egalitarianism ("all men are created equal") of liberalism.57
Liberal justice is not merely obedience to law: It is reasonable
obedience to laws that respect the natural equality of human beings.
Begin with liberal rationalism. Liberalism is a doctrine of consent.
But consent is surely an empty idea unless one can plausibly affirm
the existence of human beings of a certain kind-human beings who
can, on the basis of good reasons, constitute their own communities
and who are therefore not, or not wholly, constituted by their
communities. Otherwise, "consent" is a sort of fraud perpetrated by
the most effective myth-makers of community, who know how to
secure passionate agreement (but not reasonable consent) by
appealing to irrational fears and hopes. Such "consent" would simply
mask the hidden rule of some private judgment. In that case, perhaps
it would be better to choose the open rule of private judgment.
Liberals must deny that consent is empty in this way. As Michael
Walzer has argued, "it has been the great triumph of liberal theorists
and politicians to undermine every sort of political divinity, to
shatter all the forms of ritual obfuscation, and to turn the mysterious
oath into a rational contract."" That liberal achievement goes well
beyond the establishment of the rule of law.5
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
57. And yet, a glance at this famous passage suggests that there is much truth to the
suspicion that liberal justice is principally procedural: "the consent of the governed"; "laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem..." Id.
58. MICHAEL WALZER, RADICAL PRINCIPLES 25 (1980). For this and the following two
paragraphs, see generally KAUTZ, supra note 8, at 19-21, 38-41, 192-93.
59. It seems possible that this argument might yield certain substantive principles of justice
that would merit legal or constitutional protection. Thus, for example, one might reason that a
liberal polity must secure the conditions for consent, or for the reasonable love of liberty, and
that certain forms of freedom of speech (or, perhaps, freedom of the press) are indispensable
to the freedom of thought that is the inescapable foundation of political freedom. See, e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, supra note 24. Beyond this, one might even claim, though it is a much messier case,
that this argument yields the conclusion that the principal task of the Supreme Court is
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Liberalism requires the cultivation of autonomous men and
women who can choose their political principles on the basis of good
reasons, not on the basis of a history or tradition that is beyond our
choosing, and not under the sway of demagogues, ideologues, or
priests. And the cultivation of such liberal citizens surely requires
more than the establishment of the rule of law. Here then is a
substantive liberal principle of justice: The liberal polity must ensure
to its citizens a sort of liberal education, an education toward a way
of life of reasonable freedom. Hence Locke is the author of the
Thoughts on Education, as well as of the Two Treatises of
Government.
Such reasonable freedom is possible only if "there is something in
man that is not altogether in slavery to his society."' For the liberal,
political freedom is founded on freedom of thought. That is, the most
honorable liberal citizens will be (at least potentially) rebels or
dissenters or moral strangers to their communities, not obedient,
law-abiding subjects. But this cannot mean merely that liberals seek
freedom from the particular officeholders who possess political
power, narrowly understood, here and now. Such freedom is indeed
quite important from a certain point of view, but it is surely
incomplete. The freedom from authority that the liberal seeks is not
simply freedom from this or that particular petty authority in power
today; it is also, and more fundamentally, freedom from those
greater authorities, the ruling orthodoxies in a political community
and their interpreters, the teachers of those who hold power. If such
freedom is not possible for human beings, then neither is political
freedom, for in that case politics would everywhere, including in
liberal polities, authorize the tyranny of those partisan or sectarian
authorities who happen to write the founding myths of the
community. If liberalism is defensible, moral freedom from the
authority of community must be possible: Only those who are able to
think for themselves are truly able to choose for themselves. As
Nathan Tarcov says of Locke's political theory: "Rationality enables
and entitles us to be free, whether from political tyranny, as in the
Two Treatises, or from intellectual superstition and authority, as in
the Essay.""1 Insofar as liberalism is a doctrine of (reasonable)
"policing the process of representation," thus ensuring that the forms of consent do not mask
the hidden rule of some private judgment. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
73-104 (1980).
60. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 3 (1953).
61. TARCOV, supra note 7, at 211. Thus, a liberal could never assent to the stronger version
of the claim that justice is obedience to law that Alasdair MacIntyre defends in his fine essay Is
Patriotism a Virtue? MacIntyre argues that, from a certain point of view, "liberal morality is a
permanent source of moral danger because of the way it renders social and moral ties too open
to dissolution by rational criticism." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, IS PATRIOTISM A VIRTUE? 18
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consent, liberal justice requires more than establishment of the rule
of law. It follows that there is a role for the political philosopher in
the liberal polity: to aid in educating the public mind toward
reasonable love of liberty.
Next, consider liberal egalitarianism. Of course, the idea of
equality is already somehow implicit in the idea of the rule of law,
for reasons already sufficiently indicated. On the other hand,
perhaps it is sufficient to notice that the procedural equality achieved
by establishment of genuine rule of law-where there is government
of laws and not of men-is not an especially dignified or noble
equality. Moreover, such equality is not the end of liberal political
life, but a means to liberty understood as security. For this reason, it
is hard to imagine that a liberal republic founded on equality thus
understood (strict equality before the law, whose aim is to achieve
the end of liberty, and no more) could inspire loyalty to the
community, or patriotism, in citizens. Put otherwise, the equality of
which Lincoln speaks in the Gettysburg Address is something more
robust and more splendid than the equality of the Declaration of
Independence; it thus earns, so to speak, the last full measure of
devotion.
The meaning of equality in a liberal polity is, of course, a
controversial question, and I do not aim to settle it here. For present
purposes, I want simply to argue that the achievement of substantive
equality (however understood) must always follow upon the
achievement of consent (procedural equality), according to the
classical liberal view. That is, only when a certain substantive
understanding of equality enjoys the reasonable consent of the
people can it fairly (that is, consistently with the rule of law and the
abolition of the claims of private judgment) be said to be embodied
in the law of a liberal polity.
Consider the exemplary case of Lincoln, the most remarkable
partisan of the idea of equality in American political history. Lincoln
understood his task during the late 1850s, and again during the war,
to be the task of educating the public mind regarding the meaning of
the nation's dedication to the proposition that all men are created
equal. The drama of such a liberal education toward a reasonable
love of liberty consists in the necessity to harmonize respectable
conservative and radical impulses, to stand now inside and now
outside the community, to reconcile justice with consent. Such an
(1981). Indeed, "loyalty to [one's] community... is, on this view[,] a prerequisite for morality";
and this loyalty must be "in some respects unconditional, so in just those respects rational
criticism is ruled out." Id. That "communitarian" moral understanding, now so common among
political theorists, is utterly incompatible with liberal principles of justice, above all because it
undermines the liberal doctrine of consent.
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education toward liberty enables human beings to move between the
kind of thick description of a way of life that Walzer calls
"interpretation" and the more Socratic quest for a way out of the
cave that Walzer (as well as most contemporary theorists) eschews.62
Lincoln's task in the 1850s and during the war was to achieve
justice in a way that was compatible with the liberal principles of the
Declaration: that is, by consent. Here, I can only summarize the
conclusions of a longer argument, but the case seems to me to
provide a useful illustration of the relation of justice and consent in a
liberal polity. Lincoln was a moderate statesman. His moderation
consisted in a prudent regard for the weak hands of justice in this
world, but such a regard does not abandon the cause of justice to its
enemies. 3 Begin with the first question of Plato's Republic. "What if
we won't listen?" Socrates' friend asks playfully. But the play
contains a serious warning: Justice is weak and needs friends. "What
if we won't listen?" says power to wisdom: That is the problem of
political philosophy, then and now. Everywhere, the stronger rule.
Justice can make its way in the world only if the stronger are
somehow induced to listen, to hear the reasons of its friends.
Moderation is the political virtue that mediates between reason and
power.
Consider, for example, Lincoln's reluctance to accede to policies at
the outset of the Civil War that might have transformed the war into
a "remorseless revolutionary struggle" over the status of slavery in
the nation. ' This reluctance greatly troubled his more radical
62. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 3-32 (1987).
Lincoln and Frederick Douglass are two notable cases of the hybrid social criticism described
in the text. It would not be easy to say whether these men were conservatives or radicals.
Douglass, a former slave and an abolitionist, despised the hypocrisy of those who professed a
faith in the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution while
remaining indifferent to the evident injustice of slavery. Yet, during most of his public life he
was a vigorous partisan of the Constitution, and he argued (against many of his abolitionist
friends) that fidelity to the Constitution was the ground on which those animated by an
honorable and patriotic aspiration to abolish slavery must stand. Douglass commonly speaks as
both a citizen and a philosopher, a patriotic American and a radical critic of what Americans
had done, an angry friend of his fellow citizens and a bitter enemy who loves justice. So too,
Lincoln's speeches reveal a mind at once conservative and radical: The Gettysburg Address
and, in a more prosaic mode, the Peoria and Cooper Institute speeches are masterly
expositions of the principles of the American regime. By contrast, the Second Inaugural and
the Lyceum speech, and many remarks scattered throughout his more ordinary speeches, are
radical expressions of doubt regarding the justice and health of American institutions. Each
man was at ease speaking both of our duties as American citizens and of our essential
humanity. This broadmindedness, among other virtues (the capacity to temper justice with
mercy, indignation with charity, and to resist both blind love and foolish moralism), enabled
these statesmen to raise their community above itself, so to speak, for a time. See Steven
Kautz, The Postmodern Self and the Politics of Liberal Education, in THE COMMUNITARIAN
CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM 164, 167-71 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996).
63. On Lincoln's "deadly moderation," see LORD CHARNWOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN
114-15 (1996).
64. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in ABRAHAM
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Republican and abolitionist friends. It was manifested above all in
his early understanding of the proper war aim of the North-to
preserve the Union, not to emancipate the slave. According to the
ordinary view, some combination of political prudence (concern
about driving away the border states and Northern Unionist
supporters of the war) and constitutional scruple (concern about the
limits of presidential and even congressional power to free the
slaves) led Lincoln to resist the impulse toward embracing
emancipation as a war aim. True enough. But it is also worth
emphasizing Lincoln's argument from self-government, and more
generally his desperate desire that emancipation be achieved by
some form of popular consent (hence, his continuing efforts to
induce border states to accept gradual and compensated
emancipation, even after the decision to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation had been taken).65
In a liberal democracy, where the people are mighty, it is the task
of the democratic statesman to educate the public mind-to teach
the people, who are naturally as disposed to wickedness and folly as
are the mighty in other regimes, to love justice, or at least to hear the
reasons of the friends of justice. The moderation of such a statesman
consists in a prudent regard for the difficulty of this task: Shouting
won't do. The moderate statesman must look now toward justice-
toward the principle of the Declaration, for example, that "all men
are created equal"-and now toward the people, whose passions,
prejudices, and interests must be consulted (accommodated, tamed,
and educated) in a democracy. Sometimes those passions and
prejudices will be for a time incurable. In such a case, silence or even
a deceptive indulgence of the prejudice is demanded. But sometimes
the passions and interests of the people might somehow be attached
to a nobler end, and the people might thereby be led to listen to the
claims of the friends of justice. This is the story, it seems to me, of
Lincoln's political rhetoric during the 1850s.
Lincoln saw that the same Declaration that announces the
inalienable rights of human beings also affirms that government
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. Here we
LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 630 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) [hereinafter LINCOLN'S
WRMNGS].
65. Or, consider Lincoln's insistence, during the 1850s and especially during the debates
with Douglas, that the question of the ultimate extinction of slavery be kept separate from the
question of the social and political equality of the races. In Lincoln's view, once these causes
were united, they would surely fall together. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria,
Illinois, in LINCOLN'S WRITINGS, supra note 64, at 291-92; Abraham Lincoln, First Debate, in
LINCOLN'S WRITINGS, supra note 64, at 442-45. This is the strategy of a moderate democratic
statesman, who serves the cause of justice by leading the people where they are prepared to be
led, while not arousing their uglier passions and prejudices, thus securing the consent of the
people to some part of what justice demands.
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have, to say no more, competing principles of justice, and those
principles are not always in harmony, as the terrible case of
American slavery reveals. So Lincoln's task, the task of a liberal
democratic statesman, was not only to accommodate the power of
the people, who are sometimes wicked and sometimes foolish, and
who will sometimes say to their teachers of justice, "What if we
won't listen"? Not only this, but Lincoln was also obliged to
recognize the justice of the claim of the people to rule. That is the
principle of Lincoln's moderation: The claims of justice made on
behalf of the slave ("all men are created equal") had to be
harmonized with the lesser, but respectable, claim of the people to
rule (both because the people are the stronger and because the
consent of the governed is the foundation of just government).
Certainly, there is more to liberal justice than the "rule of law." As
political theorists, and above all as citizens, it is our business and
sometimes our duty to reflect upon these higher meanings of liberal
justice-principally, I have argued, to reflect upon the importance of
freedom of thought and the meaning of equality in a liberal
community. But I have also argued that the higher meanings of
liberal justice are properly subordinated to the first and fundamental
meaning of liberal justice-namely, that the most fundamental task
of liberal government is to establish and maintain the rule of law
founded on the consent of the people. Only when a certain
substantive understanding of justice enjoys the reasonable consent of
the people can it fairly be said to be embodied in the law of a liberal
polity consistent with the rule of law and the abolition of the claims
of private judgment. It is the business of political theorists (and
statesmen and citizens) to educate the public mind regarding the
higher meanings of liberal justice, but it is the duty of lawyers to
ensure that the most fundamental form of liberal justice -the rule of
law, established by consent-is preserved.
IV. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL REASONING
Here is the older conventional view: It is the business of political
philosophers to worry about justice; it is the business of lawyers and
judges to worry about the law. Put another way, political philosophers
say what the law ought to be; lawyers and judges say what the law is.
These are fundamentally different sorts of inquiries.
I have argued that the task of liberal political theory and liberal
statesmanship is to ensure, above all else, that one citizen need not
fear another citizen. Here in the liberal polity, as George Washington
says in a justly famous letter to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport,
"every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there
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shall be none to make him afraid."' That is liberty. It follows that the
idea of the rule of law-understood in Montesquieu's way as mutual
obedience to law, and no more-will have an unusually proud place in
liberal theory and practice. That is because the rule of law is the
principal remedy for the most fundamental and natural disorder of
political life-that human beings have too many good reasons to fear
their fellow citizens and so they must take good care to provide for
their mutual security. Beyond this, I have argued that the idea of
consent is the fundamental principle of liberal justice; no special
privileges may be granted to any species of "private judgment" on the
liberal view. Liberals cannot abide any form of the common pre-
liberal argument that wisdom and virtue are titles to rule. When we
liberals say that government by law is to be preferred to government
by men, we mean that government by the consent of free and equal
persons will ensure greater security than government by the putatively
wise or virtuous exercising private judgment beyond consent. It
follows that no quest to achieve "substantive justice" can be permitted
to evade the rigorous requirements of the liberal doctrine of consent.
Liberty (and thus consent) is prior to justice.
If the argument here is right, the tasks of the liberal lawyer and the
liberal political theorist are fundamentally different. But the line
between legal reasoning and political philosophizing in contemporary
legal scholarship is in fact often blurry, indistinct, or even erased. And
this is a notable tendency across the political spectrum, from Critical
Legal Studies and various species of postmodernism in the law on the
left, to mainstream jurisprudential thought and the new "republican"
legal theories in the center, to economic analysis of the law on the
right.
The line between legal reasoning and political philosophizing,
between law and justice, can of course be erased from either side. It is
erased from the side of law wherever legal scholars and judges learn to
say, with Dworkin (speaking of the U.S. Supreme Court):
We have an institution that calls some issues from the
battleground of power politics to the forum of principle. It holds
out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts
between individual and society will once, someplace, finally,
become questions of justice. I do not call that religion or
prophecy. I call it law.67
And it is erased from the side of justice wherever political theorists
deny that the distinction between justice and law can be sustained-
66. Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport (Aug. 18,
1790), in GEORGE WASHINGTON: WRITINGS 767 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997).
67. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 71.
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that is, wherever political theorists teach that justice is no more than
the advantage of the established ruling body, or that so-called justice is
simply obedience to laws made by the powerful for their own
advantage. On this radical view, there is no justice, there is only law;
and law is only power. There is no path from the cave of power and
prejudice to the sun of neutrality and objectivity-either by way of
law's putative neutrality or by way of an objective philosophical
account of justice. Thus, for example, "it is an article of faith [among
radical legal theorists] that legal rules are indeterminate and serve
only to disguise the law's white, male bias."'
But here I will focus on the first sort of argument that blurs the line
between legal reasoning and political philosophizing. How far must
legal reasoning, and especially constitutional interpretation, rest upon
moral and political philosophy, or upon a substantive (not merely
procedural) account of justice? The most important book of the most
celebrated contemporary legal scholar, Ronald Dworkin's Taking
Rights Seriously, famously contains the following, now remarkable,
passage:
Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it isolates
the problem of rights against the state and makes that problem
part of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of constitutional
law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to
take place. It is perfectly understandable that lawyers dread
contamination with moral philosophy, and particularly with
those philosophers who talk about rights, because the spooky
overtones of that concept threaten the graveyard of reason. But
better philosophy is now available than the lawyers may
remember. Professor Rawls of Harvard, for example, has
published an abstract and complex book about justice which no
constitutional lawyer will be able to ignore.69
By now, such "dread" of moral philosophy, including rights talk, is
rather quaint. To be sure, a few legal scholars and political theorists
still fear that liberal theorists who talk about rights are talking
"nonsense upon stilts."7 ° But not many. And they too can have their
pick of an extraordinary variety of other newly-revived modes of
political theorizing, from utilitarianism to republicanism to
postmodernism to feminism and even classical liberalism. The revival
68. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (1997); see also id. at 37 (arguing that this
"indeterminacy thesis" is "intimately related to the radicals' view that objectivity and
neutrality are merely shams concealing a dominance game").
69. DwoRKIN, supra note 5, at 149 (emphasis added).
70. JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 491,
501 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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of political theory in the law follows, of course, the resurrection of
political theory itself, the death of which had been prematurely
pronounced in the 1950s and 1960s. The lawyer's dread of moral
philosophy has unquestionably been overcome.
But now that we are all moral and political philosophers-and,
indeed, much of the best contemporary moral and political philosophy
is contained in the writings of legal scholars - a nice question arises
regarding the legitimacy of applying the discoveries and inventions
and interpretations of moral and political philosophers in the courts.
The problem of legitimacy is pressing for two reasons. First, as
Montesquieu reminds us, the court can be the most terrible
department of government in a liberal polity.71 Here, the collision
between the power of the state and the interests and rights of
individuals is most raw; here, liberal citizens risk the loss of life,
liberty, and property, and so they have a right to demand the most
rigorous fidelity to the rule of law. If we must be deprived of life and
liberty, the liberal citizen says, let it be by rules of law founded on
common consent, and not by rules of law founded on the private
judgments of moral philosophers (perhaps less friendly to currently
favored liberties than Rawls). Here, in short, the emancipation of
private judgment is most dangerous to individuals.
Second, as is well known, the legitimacy of blurring the line between
moral philosophy and legal reasoning is a problem when courts strike
down, as unconstitutional, laws that presumably reflect the judgment
of democratic majorities. As Dworkin powerfully puts the objection:
It seems to erode the crucial distinction between law and
morality by making law only a matter of which moral principles
happen to appeal to the judges of a particular era. It seems
grotesquely to constrict the moral sovereignty of the people
themselves-to take out of their hands, and remit to a
professional elite, exactly the great and defining issues of
political morality that the people have the right and the
responsibility to decide for themselves."
Suppose that A Theory of Justice is indeed "better philosophy" than
Two Treatises of Government. So what? On this question, the work of
Ronald Dworkin is inescapable. In a series of important books,
including Taking Rights Seriously," A Matter of Principle," and most
recently Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
71. See MoNTEsQurEu, supra note 9, at 158.
72. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4
(1996).
73. DWORKIN, supra note 5.
74. DWORKIN, supra note 6.
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Constitution,75 Dworkin has argued that judges simply cannot escape
questions of substantive justice, or of moral and political philosophy,
both when they interpret the Constitution and more generally when
they apply the law in hard cases:
Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory,
namely, that men have moral rights against the state. The
difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and
equal protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to
moral concepts rather than laying down particular conceptions;
therefore a court that undertakes the burden of applying these
clauses fully as law must be an activist court, in the sense that it
must be prepared to frame and answer questions of political
morality.76
In what follows, I propose to consider Dworkin's argument for the
necessity of a fusion of moral theory and constitutional law. I argue
that a number of pathologies arise from the failure of Dworkin (and
many other legal scholars and judges of various ideological views) to
respect essential liberal boundaries between legal reasoning and
political theorizing. The account here is abstract-that is, it does not
do justice in particular cases. But I mean to identify broad tendencies,
and I suppose that these will be recognized. The three pathologies that
I will discuss are these: Constitutional doctrine is today founded on
too much philosophy (or "private judgment") and too little consent (or
"public philosophy"); this feature of our constitutionalism has
contributed to a decline of popular capacities for self-government; and,
as a consequence, we have lately experienced a self-destructive rise of
"rights talk. "
Dworkin's fundamental argument can be sketched in outline form.
Many of the most important provisions of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment are "vague" and "abstract." How could it be
otherwise in a Constitution designed to govern a dynamic polity and
an energetic people not today only but for many future generations?
So we must presume that the Constitution's authors chose vagueness
or abstraction for a good reason, or with an intention. What was that
original intention? Dworkin here develops a now famous distinction
between "concepts" (of fairness, equality, cruelty, and so on) and
"conceptions" (of fairness, equality, cruelty, and so on).' "Suppose I
tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly,"
he asks.78 What do I mean thereby to forbid? Possibly I have in mind a
75. DWORKIN, supra note 72.
76. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 147.
77. Id. at 134-35.
78. Id. at 134.
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number of specific kinds of unfair conduct that I intend to forbid.
Indeed, it is even possible that I mean to forbid only these actions. But
surely this is unlikely (why not present a concrete list of rules
proscribing specific conduct, in that case, rather than an abstract
command?). The abstract character of my statement, Dworkin argues,
suggests that I intend to say something broader and more
indeterminate: I mean to instruct my children "to be guided by the
concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I might
have had in mind."79 That is, I mean to forbid conduct that is "in fact
unfair," as a general rule and not only in the particular sorts of cases
that I might have had in mind; this requires my children to apply a
concept of fairness beyond and perhaps even against my particular
conception of unfair conduct.' In order to comply with my command,
Dworkin argues, my children must think about what "fairness" means
and must act on the basis of their best understanding of "fairness";
indeed, "I give my views on that issue no special standing."81 (This last
development of the argument seems to me wildly implausible with
respect to the case of parental instructions to children, and somewhat
misleading with respect to questions of constitutional interpretation.)
Dworkin argues that many of the most important constitutional
clauses protecting individual rights contain abstract moral concepts of
this kind.' So far, so good. Surely the authors of these constitutional
provisions meant to establish abstract guarantees of the sort Dworkin
describes. But does it follow that "lawyers and judges cannot avoid
politics in the broad sense of political theory," or that constitutional
interpretation is inescapably a species of moral and political
philosophy? 3 Take Dworkin's argument on cruelty:
It would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by
the fact that when the clause was adopted capital punishment
was standard and unquestioned. That would be decisive if the
framers of the clause had meant to lay down a particular
conception of cruelty, because it would show that the
conception did not extend so far. But it is not decisive of the
different question the Court now faces, which is this: Can the
Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of
cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make death
cruel...? But in fact the Court can enforce what the
Constitution says only by making up its own mind about what is
cruel, just as my children, in my example, can do what I said
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 135.
82. See id. at 134-35.
83. DwORKIN, supra note 6, at 146.
1999]
27
Kautz: Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 435
only by making up their own minds about what is fair.'
This seems to me a step too far. Dworkin argues that once one
concedes that a constitutional provision is designed to establish an
abstract guarantee, it follows immediately that "judges must make
substantive decisions of political morality not in place of judgments
made by the 'Framers' but rather in service of those judgments":
Political theory is inescapable.85 But surely there is an intermediate
possibility: The authors of a constitutional provision might have
intended to establish an abstract guarantee (and not merely
guarantees of a specific list of particular rights "recognized... at a
fixed date in history"86), but they might have understood this abstract
guarantee to have a determinate and unchanging meaning. That is,
they would have been prepared to concede that some of their
particular conceptions might have been in error (that segregated
schools violate the abstract guarantee of equal protection, say, even on
the original and determinate meaning of equal protection), in which
case their particular judgment would properly be subject to correction
by a future Court more faithful to the original moral concept than its
authors had been. And such a correction would indeed be, as Dworkin
says, an act of fidelity to the original intention of the authors of the
constitutional provision-saving their better (abstract) judgment from
their worse (particular) judgments.
And yet, it certainly does not follow that the framers of abstract
constitutional provisions would (necessarily or even probably) have
been prepared to concede that their moral concepts themselves might
have been so far in error as to justify correction by a future Court
guided by a "better philosophy." For example, they surely would not
have conceded that the moral concept "equality" is properly
understood as Rawls understands it in A Theory of Justice, say; and so
they would not have conceded that the Court should rest its judgments
upon this concept of equality rather than upon a concept of equality
that might conceivably have guided the authors of the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, Dworkin's whole argument here seems to
rest on an equivocation: Equality here, equality there, we must be
talking about the same thing. But Dworkin consistently makes this
stronger claim, as in the passage cited above regarding cruelty: The
original moral concept is no more privileged than the original
conceptions (just as the parent supposedly refrains from giving his
84. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 135-36. See also the recent exchange on this point between
Dworkin and Justice Scalia, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 119-27, 144-
49 (Amy Gutnann ed., 1997).
85. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 49.
86. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 134.
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own views on the meaning of fairness special standing). Thus Dworkin
urges the Court to "revise these principles from time to time in light of
what seems to the Court fresh moral insight."' He argues that the
"better interpretation" of a legal rule is simply one that "states a
sounder principle of justice" than the alternatives.' In particular,
Dworkin argues,
there can be no useful interpretation of what [the Equal
Protection Clause] means which is independent of some theory
about what political equality is and how far equality is required
by justice, and the history of the last half-century of
constitutional law is largely an exploration of exactly these
issues of political morality."89
Most radically, in his most recent statement on this issue Dworkin
argues that
very different, even contrary conceptions of constitutional
principle-of what treating men and women as equals really
means, for example-will often fit language, precedent, and
practice well enough to pass these tests [the tests imposed by
"the ordinary craft of a judge"], and thoughtful judges must then
decide on their own which conception does most credit to the
nation.'
What if we resist Dworkin's stronger claim, while conceding the
force of the fundamental distinction between "concepts" and
"conceptions"? Then wouldn't we be obliged to grant a privileged or
even decisive force to a kind of original meaning-not to the
particular conceptions held by the framers of such constitutional
provisions, but to their philosophical understanding of the abstract
moral concepts that they chose to establish in the Constitution? That
is, we would impose upon the judge a different sort of task than the
philosophical task that Dworkin insists is inescapable. We would ask
the judge to undertake an historical inquiry, not a philosophical
inquiry-or, more precisely, we would ask the judge to study
philosophy in the manner of an historian of philosophy, not in the
manner of, for example, a philosopher. We would not ask the judge
to eschew philosophy in favor of narrow historical inquiry regarding
how the framers of a constitutional provision would have answered
87. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 137.
88. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 161.
89. Id. at 165.
90. DWORKIN, supra note 72, at 11. On "which conception does most credit to the nation,"
see id. at 7-8, 10; and DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 181-213. See also DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 149
(analogizing constitutional interpretation, where judges decide "on their own which conception
does most credit to the nation," to literary criticism, where the critic "attempts to show which way
of reading... the text reveals it as the best work of art").
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the specific question before the court. Instead, we would ask the
judge to undertake a broader historical inquiry into the philosophical
meaning of the moral and political "concepts" embraced by those
framers. We would ask the judge to draw the philosophy of the
Constitution out of the Constitution itself, which is fundamentally a
historical task, and not to impose a "better philosophy" on the
Constitution from the outside. Thus, on cruelty, we would not ask,
"would the framers have concluded that the death penalty is
unconstitutional because it is a cruel punishment?" (This is a too
narrow historical inquiry into the particular conceptions of the
framers.) Nor would we ask, "is the death penalty in fact a cruel
punishment, according to our best philosophical ideas about
cruelty?" (This is an overly broad philosophical inquiry that imposes
the private judgment of philosophers on the people, without their
consent.) Rather, we would ask, "is the death penalty in fact
incompatible with the moral principle prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishments, as the framers understood that principle, whether or
not the framers would have recognized this incompatibility?" (This is
a broader historical inquiry into the philosophical meaning of the
moral "concepts" of the framers.)"
But why should we be eager to resist Dworkin's stronger claim, that
we should seek a "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory"?
Why should we deny that it is the job of judges to undertake the hard
philosophical task of interpreting the great abstractions of our
Constitution "on their own," in search of a philosophy (of equality, or
justice, or whatever) that will do "most credit to the nation"? The
account of liberalism presented above suggests three reasons for
resisting Dworkin's project, or for resisting the tendency of
contemporary legal scholarship to blur the line between legal
reasoning and political philosophy. First, there is no rule of law
without consent. But how can we make intelligible the claim that the
people have somehow consented, much less consented according to
appropriate constitutional forms, to be governed by the "better
philosophy" of A Theory of Justice, or by any other better philosophy
than the philosophy that guided their own reflection and choice at the
time?' Dworkin's blurring of the line between law and justice depends
91. It should be noted that this is a perfectly ordinary form of moral inquiry, one that we
employ whenever we ask a community to live up to its own professed moral principles, while
refraining from imposing alien moral principles on an unwilling community. This is the
conservative dimension of the thought of Lincoln and Douglass, discussed above. See supra note
62. As a strategy for legal reasoning, it largely disposes of the vexing problem of consent.
92. It is the task of Ackerman's recent work to address this serious problem of liberal theory.
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991). That work is impressive, but it seems to me
that the cleverness of his argument betrays its inadequacy: Does "consent" mean anything, if it
can be achieved so readily, in the dark and almost unnoticed until the moment has long passed
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on forgetting the centrality of the idea of the rule of law, and the
companion idea of consent, in liberal theory.
Second, as Dworkin's reference to the "better philosophy" of Rawls
suggests, the problem of "private judgment," discussed above, is
insurmountable here. Even if Rawls's A Theory of Justice teaches the
truth about justice, there can be no doubt that this is a truth beyond
popular consent, as Rawls concedes in his recent work on political
liberalism and the idea of an overlapping consensus.93 Why should it
matter to the legal scholar or judge that Rawls's A Theory of Justice is
better philosophy than, say, Locke's Two Treatises, unless that private
judgment somehow comes to be established as a public philosophy
(strictly speaking, in a liberal polity, established as law)? Again, the
liberal cannot abide any claim to rule that is not founded on the
consent of free and equal persons. But when the private judgments of
political philosophers and legal scholars ("but better philosophy is
now available than the lawyers may remember") are recognized as
having legal authority-when, that is, it becomes so much easier to
bypass popular consent-the risk grows that doctrines that do not
enjoy the genuine consent of the people will be illegitimately
established in law. Put otherwise, the quest for a "fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory" is founded on a hidden claim to
rule made on behalf of legal scholars and political theorists.
Third, the substantive understandings of justice (or equality, or
cruelty, or whatever) that are at issue here are inescapably
controversial. Such controversies threaten the security that liberalism
aims to protect, thus exacerbating the problems of evasion of consent
and elevation of private judgment. Consider, for example, the problem
of distributive justice, which is so central to contemporary liberal
political theorizing-and which has lately become central to liberal
legal thinking as well. The classical liberal argument counsels reticence
about distributive justice. If justice requires something more than
respect for the rights that are a means to peace-roughly, if "justice"
means "distributive justice" -then a public life that seeks to "establish
Justice" must also somehow establish certain authoritative
philosophical opinions. But these opinions are matters of dispute
among human beings-often angry dispute. Ideas of distributive
justice are always more or less controversial, above all because they
fail to acknowledge the proud sense of equality that persuades almost
every citizen that no one knows better than he does what is "fitting"
for him, but also because they sometimes fail to recognize the
even by those who are said to have done the consenting? For so grave a constitutional act as
amending the Constitution, surely greater transparency is required on any intelligible account of
consent.
93. See RAWLS, supra note 55, at 133-72.
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necessity of accommodating the similarly proud sense of merit that
persuades other citizens that they deserve their unequal station. And
so, if liberal politics aims at peace above all, it can establish justice
only by assigning to justice a simple, minimal, and uncontroversial
meaning (respect for rights, performance of contracts, punishment of
criminals, and the like). That is why liberal philosophers have until
quite recently evaded the problem of distributive justice: This may be
better philosophy than contemporary liberal philosophy. Of course,
political philosophers will continue to debate the question of
distributive justice. But for the philosopher, the question of civil strife,
and the pride of stubborn citizens, is not at issue.94
Let me conclude by briefly addressing two other pathologies that
might follow from blurring the line between legal reasoning and
political philosophy. Some years ago, the political theorist Michael
Walzer wrote an essay in Dissent in which he complained that the left
had come to rely too heavily on the courts to be an engine of social
change. As a result, he argued, the left was beginning to lose some of
its formerly robust capacities for political action, which had always
been one of its strengths.95 Today, conservatives often complain as well
that the willingness of the courts to strike down democratic decisions
of local communities has had an enervating effect on citizenship. The
price is a high one, for the rule of law is undermined where the
capacities of citizens for reasonable consent are diminished. Indeed, in
a growing number of cases, judges seem to be willing to reach
fundamental decisions about justice that were once thought to belong
to the democratic citizenry. The result has been that the reasoning of
judges has an increasingly central place in our political life, and the
common deliberation of citizens an increasingly marginal place. Self-
government by consent is arguably on the decline.
This problem also has its roots in the confusion of legal reasoning
and political theorizing that is at issue here. As questions about rights
or justice are more and more often treated as legal questions, the
opportunities for common deliberation about questions of political
right diminish-and so too do the opportunities to educate the public
mind. The result is a citizenry less capable of serious reflection about
justice, and more deferential to the courts and other authorities. That
is, the problem here is not so much "judicial tyranny," as conservatives
sometimes call it; the danger here is increasing popular slavishness to
authority, and a decline in the capacities of citizens for the sort of
reasonable freedom discussed above.
94. I have elsewhere made a similar argument regarding the controversial nature of the
contemporary liberal understanding of equality. See KAUTZ, supra note 8, at 68-75.
95. See Michael Walzer, The Courts, the Elections, and the People, 28 DISSENT 153 (1981).
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Finally, it is notable that the debate among legal scholars and
political theorists about "rights" today, between their libertarian and
egalitarian defenders, often simply mirrors the contemporary political
debate between conservatives and liberals. That is a problem, because
it means that the appeal to rights can no longer serve as a trump or as
a principled means of resolving or limiting partisan political
controversies. That is, we no longer possess a nonpartisan consensus
or a public philosophy of rights that transcends partisan diversity. This
is in part the product of the confusion of legal reasoning and political
theorizing that is at issue here. Too often, legal scholars (and even
political theorists) move without much fuss from a philosophical
conclusion (x is a right, according to the "better philosophy" of
Rawls's A Theory of Justice) to a legal conclusion (x should be
recognized in law as a right). But we should remind ourselves that
private philosophy is not public philosophy, that the principles of
justice that enjoy popular consent, on any imaginable meaning of
consent, are probably not the principles of justice embraced by
intellectuals and philosophers.
This is a potentially dangerous development in the law. A genuine
public philosophy of rights would provide a common resource to
which appeal might be made in an effort to tame partisan squabbling
about secondary questions by means of appeal to agreements about
fundamental principles. But if the pretense is maintained that every
partisan claim has the status of a right, then we lose the possibility of
such an appeal along with the habit of reminding ourselves that what
unites us is more important than what divides us. Today, claims about
rights are themselves almost always subject to partisan debate, and
these debates are often barely disguised quarrels about interests.
Compare the general consensus about freedom of speech with the
partisan controversy about certain privacy rights. As Michael Walzer
says, "the effort to produce a complete account of justice or a defense
of equality by multiplying rights soon makes a farce of what it
multiplies."' Too much "rights talk" trivializes the very idea of
rights.'
V. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by recalling the story of the two imaginary law
professors with which I began. The error of the second sort of legal
theorist is what we might call liberal hubris. That is, such theorists
have too much confidence in liberal principles and liberal
96. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE at xv (1983).
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institutions, and (as a consequence) too much faith in those who
claim to rule on the basis of knowledge of those principles (what I
have been calling "private judgment"). But it seems to me that
another sort of error, almost the opposite and indeed a sort of
natural companion to liberal hubris, is made by those critics of
liberal principles and institutions who call for more or less
fundamental transformation of the liberal constitutional order,
including the forms of the rule of law, on the grounds that liberalism
is at its core incoherent or corrupt-call this anti-liberal utopianism.
Both philosophical tendencies can give rise to a blurring of the lines
between legal reasoning and political philosophizing.
I wonder whether either philosophical posture quite does justice to
the modest but real achievements of liberal polities-not that such
polities can achieve justice in anything like the way that super-
liberals like Dworkin might hope, but that such polities have on the
whole succeeded in the more modest aim of providing for our
relatively comfortable security, in a world not naturally hospitable to
the aspirations of human beings, owing to certain qualities of nature
and human nature. If we abandon the postures of liberal hubris and
anti-liberal utopianism, then we are left with what? Not justice,
which both these philosophies seek, but security (or liberty). And
that is no mean achievement, as a glance around the world reminds
US.
There is of course a mode of legal scholarship that suits this more
modest philosophical posture. The liberal as I have described her
says: "Forget justice, and attend to the law, for its own sake and not
as a means to justice. It is the rule of law that enables human beings
to live free, secure, and prosperous (if not quite to achieve justice)."
She says: "Mind your own business-it is the most important
business to be done in liberal society."
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